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Summary of the Doctoral Dissertation titled:

**Counterintelligence of the Polish People's Republic
in the system of political power governance. From
the Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal
Affairs to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the
Polish Office of State Protection.**

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The history of Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (civil counterintelligence) and the principles of its functioning in the context of the political conditions of the Polish People's Republic (PRL) have not yet been described in the Polish literature, both in the scientific and journalistic realms. So far, no scientific research has been conducted that would comprehensively illustrate the scope of operations of Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs. Regarding research on Polish civil special services during the PRL period, it is also noteworthy that there is an imbalance between publications on intelligence and those relating to counterintelligence. The former has been described much more frequently and in various aspects. Interviews with former officers of Department I of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (civil intelligence bureau) are also much more readily available.

Both the history and the issue of the political utilization of Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) are "blind spots" in Polish scientific research. This indicates the need for scientific studies that demonstrate the specific area of activities of civil counterintelligence in the PRL and the results of its work. It is also essential to give it an individual character, just as it has been done with civil intelligence in the PRL. Hence, the idea arose to subject this matter to the scientific process and present it in the dissertation titled *"Counterintelligence of the Polish People's Republic in the system of political power governance: From the Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Counterintelligence Department of the Polish Office of State Protection. [Polish: Urząd Ochrony Państwa, UOP]"*

The relationships between counterintelligence (Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the authorities of the PRL (Polish People's Republic) remain an uncharted territory. In an authoritarian political system, there is a symmetry between political power and special services, whose primary role and task are to discipline society and create facts and behaviors desired by the political authorities, including on the international stage. In this system, the actual role of these services primarily involves identifying threats to the continuity of power for a specific political group, thus defining them. They are also closely associated with isolating power from any internal influences and "recognizing and combating internal enemies." Their task is to consolidate citizens as members of the nation and to create and maintain a climate of fear within the state, including fear of state authority.

In the dissertation, an original definition of counterintelligence is adopted as an internal state service with qualifications classifying it as a special service. This means that it utilizes a special set of tools inaccessible to other services (operational methods of work, including working with

personal sources of information). Its counterpart is intelligence, which operates externally, beyond the borders of the state. As directly implied by the term, counterintelligence is, in principle, concerned with seeking out and combating any manifestations of foreign intelligence activity within the country.

Civil counterintelligence in the PRL (Polish People's Republic) constituted an element of state security, and its particular significance as a special service also stemmed from the importance of the information it protected, as well as acquired, processed, analyzed, and transmitted to the highest decision-making centers in the state. Based on the materials provided by counterintelligence, among others, key decisions were made by the state authorities. Personal reconnaissance, including the identification of foreign intelligence within domestic state structures, was a fundamental and one of the main tools of counterintelligence's work, aimed at subsequently choosing an appropriate course of action for the detention, investigation, or recruitment of foreign agents. The definition of counterintelligence should also encompass such features as gathering information and engaging in activities aimed at protecting against espionage or other intelligence activities, sabotage, acts of terrorism on behalf of or in the name of foreign states, organizations, or individuals, as well as international terrorist activities. When defining the areas of counterintelligence tasks, a distinction can also be made between its defensive and offensive actions. Offensive actions primarily involve penetration and reconnaissance operations against foreign special services. Defensive actions include combating espionage, disinformation, and subversive activities on domestic territory. Counterintelligence compiles and conveys the results of both types of operations to the governing authorities.

There are two models of counterintelligence functioning: the democratic model and the non-democratic model. In non-democratic systems, such as the period of the PRL (Polish People's Republic), the activities of internal services were most commonly referred to as political police. The content of the dissertation also relates to the proper placement of counterintelligence activities within the structures of a non-democratic state. The primary scope of counterintelligence is primarily focused on combating the activities of foreign intelligence within one's own country. In the PRL after 1956, counterintelligence was separated from other areas of operation of the internal services functioning within the Security Service of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs [Polish: Służby Bezpieczeństwa Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych, SB MSW] (Department III - combating opposition, Department IV - combating Church activities). The area of SB MSW's activities directed at combating opposition, often raised in scientific publications, was not a direct area of counterintelligence operations in the

PRL. Of course, it employed methods within operational activities that were similar to oppressive methods, such as blackmail or harassment, but these were not the dominant methods because the scope and nature of counterintelligence required different methods for effectiveness. Counterintelligence was also not directly involved in factional struggles within the political environment.

In the context of the aforementioned differences, the dissertation emphasizes that counterintelligence, understood in its basic sense as combating the activities of foreign intelligence within one's own territory, is not, even in a non-democratic system, a tool for direct opposition suppression. Specialized units within the internal service structure are responsible for that purpose. Although in the initial period of building a non-democratic state (in Poland during the years 1945-1956), counterintelligence was even utilized to consolidate communist power, after the establishment and stabilization of communist authorities, it fulfilled its classical role in circumstances typical of such a system. The exceptional circumstances distinguishing the functioning of counterintelligence in a non-democratic state from its operation in democratic countries can be identified as follows:

- The expansion of counterintelligence activities to a greater number of social and professional groups than in democratic countries.
- Involvement of counterintelligence in restricting citizens' mobility.
- Undertaking operations beyond the state borders for counterintelligence purposes.
- Focusing on the "hostile political activity" of diplomatic communities and foreigners.
- Carrying out politically commissioned actions.
- Politicization of counterintelligence personnel.
- Participation in propaganda activities conducted by political decision-makers.

The dissertation also considers models of the decision-making process involving special services. These models commonly take into account the involvement of intelligence data. In the sphere of practice, the impact of counterintelligence information on the decision-making process is synonymous with the impact of intelligence information. It pertains solely to a different area of threats or the actions of the state, depending on the data available to the service.

The emergence of information on an issue crucial for the proper functioning of the state can result from the routine activities of the counterintelligence service or from a direct demand by the decision-making entity. The effectiveness of the counterintelligence's "signaling" actions is closely related to the frequency and precision of the tasks and expectations assigned to it. The scope of relations between the special services and decision-makers is assessed by researchers

as flawed and ineffective. It implies the involvement of the counterintelligence, through its heads and directors of individual divisions, targeted at making decisions that could meet the recipients' expectations.

Counterintelligence information should possess specific characteristics. First and foremost, it should be useful, credible, and accurate, as well as prepared in a timely manner. It should have an appropriate level of detail and aggregation, and be presented in the proper format. An important aspect of preparing counterintelligence data for political decision-makers is to avoid succumbing to political influences that may arise from overly close interpersonal relationships between decision-makers and information creators.

Impartially prepared counterintelligence information can be one of the elements in the decision-making process of a political decision-maker, who then subjects it to the stages of analysis and dissemination. It is the politicians themselves who must choose which counterintelligence information to utilize and subsequently bear responsibility for the decisions made. The final preparation of decision options and their selection is reserved solely for the political decision-maker. The implementation of a decision and its consequences may necessitate modifications by the decision-maker. Observing the effects of implementing a decision may require requesting the counterintelligence service to prepare additional data.

Counterintelligence services, like intelligence services, perceive the nature of the decision-making process and their own essence of operation differently than political decision-makers. Political decision-makers often disregard counterintelligence data, believing that they possess sufficient knowledge and competence to make decisions on their own. On the other hand, the services maintain that they are uniquely qualified and adequately prepared to provide the most accurate insight into specific issues or problems. Furthermore, special service data is classified and generally inaccessible, hence its significance should be greater.

A particularly influential factor in the relationship between politicians and the services is the stability of the political system. This stability is severely disrupted during the process of transformation (such as in Poland during the period of 1989-1990). At that time, new actors emerging on the political stage face a number of problems in organizing/reorganizing the new services, both of bureaucratic and substantive nature. All of these issues typically have a negative impact on the efficiency of the service, including its collaboration with decision-makers. Very often, in a situation of political system instability, the results of the service's work are either not regarded as a valuable output by politicians or excessively exploited. Treating the service as the most significant source of knowledge can lead to an excessive level of autonomy and hinder its external oversight.

The possibility of a pathology occurring in the relationship between the political decision-maker and the special services is closely linked to the political regime, the stability of the political system, as well as the history, origins, organizational structure, and personnel of the services – factors that determine their actual position and role in the state.

Taking into account the aforementioned connections, the scientific objective of this doctoral dissertation is to present the mutual relationships between the political system understood as the governing centers of power in the Polish People's Republic and the Department II (counterintelligence) of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, which constitutes an element in building the internal security of the state. The aim is to establish whether these relationships were of a lasting or incidental nature and how they influenced the political decisions of the authorities at that time.

This dissertation presents how and in which areas the mechanisms of mutual influence between civilian counterintelligence and the highest political factors in the Polish People's Republic (PRL) took place. The research scope defined above pertains to the period of 1956-1990.

The study also examines whether the mechanisms of mutual influence between the highest political factors and special services, as a significant element of the state security structures, were maintained during the period of political transformation and afterwards.

The research conducted in this dissertation was primarily based on the analysis of operational, informational, personnel, and administrative materials collected in the Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance. These materials mainly consisted of documents produced by the Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), as well as the Cabinet of the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, the Personnel and Training Department of the MSW, the Chief Inspectorate of the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, the Training and Professional Development Department of the MSW, investigative and control files produced by the Investigative Bureau of the MSW, materials from the Academy of Internal Affairs, materials from the Higher Officer School named after Feliks Dzierżyński in Legionowo, materials collected by the Institute of National Remembrance from the Office of the Polish Council of Ministers (related to cooperation in internal affairs), military court records, such as those from the Warsaw Military District Court, and Revision Files of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw.

The source material used in this dissertation also included documents released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on its website, which were produced as a result of operational activities conducted against the Polish People's Republic (PRL). Another group of

source data utilized in the study consists of the memoirs of officers from the Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), the Counterintelligence Department of the Polish Office for State Protection (UOP), as well as biographies, memoirs, or interviews with politicians from both the PRL period and the early years of the Third Polish Republic (III RP). Sources pertaining to the period of political transformation and the early years of the Polish Office of State Protection (UOP) are very limited, especially in terms of access to reliable documentation. Therefore, the examination of counterintelligence activities during this period can currently be conducted only based on the aforementioned memoirs of participants in these events, as well as press and journalistic materials.

The research problems presented in this dissertation were analyzed using research methods characteristic of several academic disciplines, namely political science, history, and security studies. This is a result of the multidimensional nature of the dissertation and its subject matter.

A political science approach to the research problem was adopted in the dissertation. The historical perspective of the topic played a significant role in the conducted research, allowing for the utilization of achievements from fields such as law and political history, as well as the use of typical research methods associated with these disciplines.

Since this dissertation aims to demonstrate the mutual relations between the political system understood as the governing centers of power and civilian counterintelligence, which constitutes an element of internal security of the state, the methodology of security studies was also considered.

The available research material and the adopted research methods determined the structure of the dissertation, which consists of eight chapters.

Chapter I provides an overview of theories and definitions related to national and internal security, theories and elements of the political system, and analysis of the decision-making process in the context of the relationship between civilian counterintelligence and centers of political power. It also presents definitions of counterintelligence in the functioning of special services in both democratic and non-democratic systems, as well as the role of counterintelligence in the decision-making process. The chapter discusses models of relationships: the highest political factor - counterintelligence service in democratic and non-democratic systems, and their disturbances resulting from politicization. Additionally, it explores models of special service reform during the period of political transformation.

Chapter II reconstructs the placement of civilian counterintelligence within the structures of the Polish security ministry from 1945 to 1990. It provides a detailed characterization of the

tasks of individual units within the Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs in the context of political changes and major events during the period of 1956-1990.

Chapter III provides a description and explanation of the state and political structures of the Polish People's Republic in relation to their influence on the shaping of domestic and foreign policies. It considers the impact of the Polish Workers' Party [Polish: Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR] and later the Polish United Workers' Party [Polish: Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR] on the activities of the Polish security ministry and the Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the utilization of the nomenclature system and the party organizations.

Chapter IV of this dissertation describes and illuminates the process of generating external information by the Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs in the context of the informational needs of the highest political factors, influenced by internal events and the international situation. It highlights the mechanisms involved in preparing external information by the Department II and the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs' Cabinet.

Chapter V illustrates the issue of the propagandistic use of espionage matters conducted by the Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs. It characterizes the mechanisms of shaping the international policy of the Polish People's Republic through diplomatic tools supported by information provided by civilian counterintelligence. It highlights the involvement of the Department II in restricting the foreign mobility of Polish citizens and the implementation of disinformation and inspirational activities based on political demand. It provides examples of operational matters used for such purposes.

Chapter VI characterizes the activities of military attachés from NATO countries on the territory of the Polish People's Republic and the methods used by the Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs to counter military intelligence activities. It presents the issues related to the activities of military intelligence services from capitalist countries in the context of building a propaganda narrative based on political demand and the informational needs of the highest political factors in the Polish People's Republic.

Chapter VII characterizes the scope and intensity of cooperation between the Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) and its counterparts in the People's Democracies, as a result of ideological proximity and the implementation of the same principles of political and social life characteristic of socialist states. Special emphasis is placed on the cooperation with the KGB of the USSR, as the main ally of the Polish People's Republic (PRL).

Chapter VIII encompasses the impact of political changes in the second half of the 1980s on the activities of the Department II of the MSW and its relations with the highest political factors

and the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). It describes the influence of the political changes during the period of 1989-1990 on the manner and effectiveness of carrying out tasks by civilian counterintelligence. It characterizes the elements that rebounded on the structure and new functions of the Counterintelligence Department of the Polish Office of State Protection (UOP). The chapter also attempts to assess the extent of the political utilization of the Counterintelligence Department of the UOP by the new authorities of the Third Polish Republic (III RP).

The Conclusion summarises the dissertation by addressing the research objectives and problems outlined in the introduction and justifying how the research hypotheses have been positively verified. In this section, it also indicates the research difficulties encountered during the preparation of the dissertation and identifies areas related to the adopted research problems that are currently impossible to explain, such as due to a lack of access to archival materials.

At the end of the dissertation, there is a bibliography of archival materials, monographs, studies, articles, and websites used in the text. Additionally, after the main text, an Appendix is included, containing images of 16 documents utilized during the dissertation's preparation, illustrating the main problems addressed, such as the propagandist use of operational materials of Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), political influences on personnel appointments in Department II of the MSW, or the content of materials prepared by way of commission, e.g., by the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) Central Committee.

As a result of the research process, it was determined that from the inception of the security apparatus structures (Polish Ministry of Public Security, Polish Committee for Public Security, the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs) in post-war Poland, they were shaped to serve the ruling party. This objective was pursued through a dual approach: directly supervising and assigning personnel within the ministry and connecting them to the party by assigning roles to them within party structures. This arrangement ensured the participation of politically, socially, and economically privileged individuals within an elite circle. Such a combination guaranteed the loyalty and discipline of the ministry in carrying out party orders. The party and its leaders exercised manual control over the ministry, ensuring not only the execution of immediate orders but also a regular flow of information from all areas of interest to the party. These pieces of information often served as responses and creative elaborations of the opinions and views expressed by party leaders. The entire aforementioned process was carried out de facto without the involvement or with superficial involvement of state structures. The Polish Council of Ministers, occupying a central position within the state apparatus, was simultaneously the

institution to which directives from the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) were directly addressed. The direction of the Polish Council of Ministers' work by the PZPR leadership, particularly the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PZPR, was a systematic practice during the PRL period. Furthermore, in the PRL, as in other socialist countries, the practice of making joint decisions by the party's Central Committee and the Polish Council of Ministers had developed, with these decisions possessing the force of both party directives and binding normative acts. These arrangements ensured the political unity of the system, in which the unified political leadership aimed to establish a cohesive system with the state organs, and party directives formed the most crucial links between these organs.

The civilian counterintelligence - Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) - fit into the aforementioned relations by supplying the leadership of the MSW and political decision-makers with its own operational materials and information prepared based on the political needs. Research conducted on materials produced by Department II of the MSW revealed that the primary means of communication between counterintelligence and the ruling elite was the preparation of informational materials, both independently in the form of reports and as components of collective materials of the Polish Minister's Cabinet.

By providing informational support to the decision-makers in the PRL (Polish People's Republic), Department II of the MSW fulfilled the tasks assigned to it by the party and had the informational potential to influence the political and economic decisions of the ruling elite. The basic scope of the data provided by Department II related to its typical activities. This included information on the activities of individual diplomatic missions of capitalist countries accredited in the PRL, statements and opinions of diplomats and journalists from capitalist countries. It was also established that Department II also prepared documents upon special request from the clients at the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) and the First Secretary. The analysis of individual informational materials from Department II allowed for identifying periods with specific characteristic features, originating from the tasks assigned to counterintelligence by the decision-makers.

The mutual interactions between the political decision-makers and Department II are also noticeable in the process of propagandistic utilization of operational investigations into espionage conducted by counterintelligence. Through research on the operational materials of Department II - Operational Investigations, it was determined that they were used for propaganda purposes by the authorities of the PRL (Polish People's Republic). Espionage, as a natural area of counterintelligence operations, was understood very broadly, which is indicative of totalitarian states, including the PRL. It was an ideal subject for propaganda. Its

manifestations, such as the recruitment of Polish citizens by foreign intelligence services, activities detrimental to the country's economy and defense, and any contacts with the representatives of capitalist countries, particularly the United States and the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany), formed the basis of media communication in the form of planned and deliberate propaganda campaigns, supported by organized state structures. In this way, the utilized counterintelligence materials, in the hands of the authorities, became tools of manipulation and exerted pressure on the average citizen. This is a characteristic way of utilizing counterintelligence in non-democratic systems.

Another form of exerting pressure on citizens by the authorities of the PRL, utilizing the potential of Department II, was its involvement in restricting the mobility of Poles.

The operational materials of Department II also played a role in building the international position of the PRL, shaping its image in relations with other countries, and serving as a bargaining chip in pursuing political and economic interests. The documents of Department II clearly indicate that the expulsions and deportations of American military attachés were regularly employed as a method of countering and controlling the activities of American services on the territory of the PRL. Often, the expulsions of diplomats from one country served as a kind of a deterrent and warning to the diplomatic personnel of other states intending to engage in intelligence activities on the territory of the PRL. In this way, the political demand for maximum isolation of the country from Western influences was fulfilled. In the context of the aforementioned method of utilization, the operational materials of Department II also served as a tool in the hands of the ruling authorities of the PRL.

Civil counterintelligence in the PRL was also utilized by the political system of that time to shape the state's security policy. The authorities of the PRL operated under the belief that they were threatened by the Member States of NATO, especially the United States. There were concerns about armed conflict and preemptive nuclear attacks by the USA. These fears formed the basis for the intense monitoring of the activities of NATO military attachés accredited in the PRL by Department II. Investigating and countering the activities of military attachés from NATO countries was one of the important tasks of Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs. It not only encompassed a broad spectrum of actions related to countering espionage and hostile activities of foreign intelligence services but also played a role in shaping the security policy of the PRL.

Despite the difficulties encountered by Department II in its efforts to investigate the activities of NATO military attachés and the occasional lack of effectiveness in its actions, the information obtained about them remained of interest to political decision-makers until the end

of the PRL era, and likely beyond. This is evidenced by the changes that occurred in the depiction of attachés' activities towards the end of the PRL era, as well as the attention given to the evolution of the forms of activity and areas of interest of military diplomats.

The authorities of the PRL also utilized civil counterintelligence as an important element of their engagement with the socialist community of nations. In implementing the model of political and social life imposed by the USSR, the decision-makers of the PRL and their appointees as the Minister of Internal Affairs fostered cooperation with their counterparts in the countries of the People's Democracies. Agreements on cooperation with the intelligence services of partners from the Warsaw Pact were a natural consequence of the policies of the state authorities and aligned with the principles of socialist internationalism. Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs engaged in cooperation with the counterintelligence agencies of socialist countries, which was based not only on practical and pragmatic considerations but primarily on the prevailing ideology and a sense of threat from the capitalist West. It should be emphasized that during the examined historical period, there was no possibility of functioning outside the network of connections among socialist countries, both in political and security matters. Based on the analysis of documentation from Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, it was determined that Polish counterintelligence, with the materials it obtained, supported the directions of foreign policy of the Warsaw Pact signatory countries, which were prepared and consulted in the USSR.

The research also revealed that, in addition to pursuing ideological objectives, Department II received very specific and tangible assistance primarily from its Soviet counterparts. The technical weaknesses of this unit, as well as others within the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (Office "W"), necessitated support from a larger service with significantly broader experience. It was through this support that serious espionage cases handled by Department II were resolved. The results of the counterintelligence's operational work were important to the political decision-makers. As mentioned earlier, they were used for propagandistic purposes and to achieve specific outcomes in foreign policy. Therefore, the cooperation between Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and the partners from allied countries, particularly the USSR, also served as means of strengthening the capabilities of this service, which were of interest to political decision-makers.

The aforementioned findings also allow us to state that the status and role of Department II within the structures of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) were exceptionally important. The tasks assigned to this unit by the decision-makers could not be carried out by any other division within the MSW. The specificity of counterintelligence's interests and its

operational scope provided the ruling authorities with significant opportunities to gather information that could be utilized in various areas of societal influence and in shaping a foreign policy specific to a non-democratic system. Among these tasks was the constant need to identify an external enemy who destabilizes the situation in the country. The responsibility for economic failures or hostile activities of the opposition could be attributed to this enemy, and it was the materials from Department II that could showcase the presence of such a threat. Additionally, counterintelligence was also utilized to restrict the mobility of foreign citizens, which is typical for non-democratic systems and was desired by the political authorities of that time.

There was a wide range of mutual influences between the Polish Ministry of Security Affairs and the elements of the PRL authorities. They primarily occurred in the domain of building the national security within a non-democratic system, which entailed complete surveillance over the internal situation of the country and the activities of its citizens, as well as in the sphere of shaping the desired foreign policy aligned with the interests of the USSR. Department II, being an integral part of the Security Service of the MSW, carried out the tasks assigned by the ruling authorities through mechanisms shared across the entire ministry, thus becoming an element of mutual influence between the government and the leadership of the MSW.

The dissertation confirmed the research hypotheses that the political decision-makers of the Polish People's Republic (PRL), especially the First Secretaries of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee (PZPR), directly assigned tasks to Department II and that there were mutually dependent influences and interactions between the authorities of the Polish People's Republic and Department II (counterintelligence) of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs.

As a result of archival research conducted during the 1989/1990 period and the recollections of participants in the reform of Polish civilian counterintelligence, answers were also formulated to research questions related to the period of political transformation.

The reform of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1989, followed by its dissolution and the establishment of the Polish Office of State Protection (UOP), significantly influenced the scope of counterintelligence activities. With the introduction of democratic principles in the functioning of the country, these principles were also implemented in counterintelligence. Actions typical of non-democratic regimes, such as participating in restricting the mobility of foreign citizens, were eliminated. However, counterintelligence gained new areas of activity in line with its typical functions while losing areas related to new allies. This reflected the political changes in the country and the new directions of its foreign policy. Operational activities towards new partners from capitalist countries, except Germany, were abandoned, and the efforts began to focus on the eastern direction. Counterintelligence tasks also encompassed

issues related to new threats that the new state was exposed to as a result of opening borders and joining the community of capitalist countries. These were areas where Polish civilian counterintelligence had no prior experience.

An important issue for the functioning of counterintelligence and special services in general was the question of choosing the model of their operation. American scientists, including Kieran W. Williams (K. Williams, *Introduction*, in: K. Williams, D. Deletant, *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies*, cited in S. Galij-Skarbińska, *Model of Change in Civilian Special Services in Poland in 1989-1990. Establishment of the Polish Office of State Protection*, Adam Marszałek Publishing, Toruń 2019), adopted the view that in politically transitioning systems, the adoption of one of the following models was determining:

- The "zero option," which involved building new organizational structures and eliminating all former communist special service officers from the new service structures.
- The "continuation option," in its minimal version, based on personnel continuity, or in its maximal version, based on institutional continuity (taking into account apparent changes, such as a change in the institution's name).

The "zero option" was not possible to implement entirely. There was a need to refer, even if only partially, to the residual experience in this field.

Between the "zero option" and the "continuation" model, there was also an intermediate form - the "hybrid" model, which involved incorporating the experience of former officers and the new working methods related to the democratization of the life within the state.

In Poland, the decision was generally made to opt for the continuation model with elements of the zero option at the highest managerial positions, referred to as the hybrid option. This model was strongly supported by the new political partners of the Polish authorities, such as the United States and the United Kingdom.

The newly established agency, the Polish Office of State Protection (UOP), in which the Intelligence Directorate and the Counterintelligence Directorate were the most important divisions, was conceived as the antithesis of its predecessor. It was intended to be less powerful and dependent on the decisions of the new political decision-makers, as evidenced by the appointment of a political nominee as its head. The fear of a return to the just-farewelled oppressive system led to the perception of the special services as a potential threat to the new democracy, and thus their high and independent position was viewed with caution. The Polish Office of State Protection (UOP) was not a strong and all-powerful agency. It faced problems due to the transformation of the state, including a lack of funds, equipment, and a clear functioning strategy. This situation also prevailed in the counterintelligence sector, which was

assigned with new significant tasks. At the same time, the international and internal situation necessitated that the political decision-makers relied on the information provided by the services and their efficient functioning to maintain national security.

Studying the early functioning of the Polish Office of State Protection (UOP) is extremely difficult because the operational materials produced by this agency are classified as confidential. There is no possibility of conducting a reliable examination of both the results of the counterintelligence work and the potential influences on its individual actions. Researchers of this period can only rely on available journalistic materials and a few memories of the participants in these events. In terms of investigating the process of information flow between political decision-makers and the agency, these sources are not particularly valuable. However, participants in the events of the UOP's establishment and the Counterintelligence Directorate agree that it was a period of chaos, both in terms of organization and in the area of so-called political demands for information. Counterintelligence was tasked with virtually "everything," meaning practically every sphere of life, even those unrelated to counterintelligence. This prevented its precise operations in traditional areas of combating espionage and protecting state secrets. They were also hindered by a lack of operational experience in the eastern direction. However, there is no doubt that the new political decision-makers wanted to immediately exploit the potential of the special services upon assuming power. Expectations for intensive operations in the eastern direction were explicitly formulated, political tasks were assigned, and there was an influence on the course of operational matters, all without taking into account the personnel and the financial difficulties faced by the agency. Furthermore, in creating the UOP, a mechanism was established in which it becomes subject to personal power struggles with each change in the executive authority. This enables the utilization of the agency for political purposes, including actions aimed at combating political opposition.

The decisions regarding the new model of functioning for the special services in the Third Polish Republic (III RP), including counterintelligence, enabled the political exploitation of the tools possessed by the special services. In this way, although political decision-makers introduced these services into the democratic system of the state, they did not eliminate the possibility of political influence on the manner and scope of their functioning. By deciding that the nominee of the ruling party would lead the service, a space was opened for abuses and ad hoc actions. The fear of returning to a strong model of functioning for the special services from the period of the non-democratic state led to the creation of a system of weak services, subject to the same political pressures as their predecessors.

These assumptions positively confirm the second part of the research hypothesis presented in this dissertation, that there were also mutually dependent influences and interactions between the new authorities of the Republic of Poland and the newly formed civil service, namely the Polish Office of State Protection (UOP).